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FROM APATHY TO ACTIVISM: THE EMERGENCE,
IMPACT, AND FUTURE OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AS
THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NORM
LISA M. FAIRFAX*

ABSTRACT
The conventional and long-held view that public company shareholders are,
and should be, rationally apathetic is waning. Today, public company
shareholders are active. Such shareholders have actively sought to increase
their voting power and influence over director elections and other important
corporate matters. These shareholders not only have been voting, but they also
have been voting against management preferences. Moreover, public company
shareholders increasingly have begun to request, and in some instances
demand, that corporate officers and directors engage with them around a range
of issues. The shift away from shareholder apathy reflects a radical departure
from the traditional corporate governance norm of shareholder passivity. While
many corporate governance experts have conceded the descriptive shift away
from shareholder apathy (at least temporarily), few have acknowledged the
normative shift and its related significance. This Article acknowledges that shift,
and in so doing advances three important claims related to shareholders and
the corporate governance landscape. First, this Article maintains that increased
shareholder activism reflects a considerable descriptive shift in the manner in
which shareholders use their voting power to engage with the corporation.
Second, and more importantly, this Article asserts that such increased activism
reflects a normative shift pursuant to which shareholders, corporate officers,
and directors have come to believe that shareholder activism is normatively
appropriate, at least to a certain extent and for certain shareholders. In light of
the long-held belief in the viability and validity of shareholder apathy, this shift
is remarkable. Third, this Article argues that, even if efforts to scale back
shareholder activism gain some traction, those efforts will prove challenging
*
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to Ashante Rosier-Robinson for her tremendous research assistance. I would like to thank Jill
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and may be doomed to failure because of the normative shift embracing
shareholder activism as an appropriate element of corporate governance. In
these ways, this Article argues that shareholder activism is the new corporate
governance norm and, as a consequence, corporations, officers, directors,
shareholders, and regulators must both acknowledge and account for that norm.
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INTRODUCTION
Public company shareholders are rationally apathetic. Historically, most
viewed this statement as an undisputable and uncontroversial fact.1 Shareholder
apathy was reflected primarily in shareholders’ voting behavior, whereby most
public company shareholders either did not vote or voted exactly as management
recommended them to vote.2 Perhaps more importantly, most viewed
shareholder apathy as “rational,” and as the preferred corporate governance
norm. This preference rested on two distinct but related rationales. On the one
hand, public company shareholders were not only too dispersed to collectively
act, but also too dispersed to gain the knowledge and experience necessary to
ensure that their actions would be informed and thus in the corporation’s best
interests.3 On the other hand, directors were better situated, better informed, and
thus better suited to make decisions on behalf of the corporation.4 These
conventional understandings rendered shareholder apathy rational and
preferable. Hence, it was conventional wisdom, shared by corporate officers,
directors, and shareholders alike, that shareholder apathy was the corporate
governance norm.
Today, the public company shareholder is far from apathetic. Such
shareholders5 have actively sought to increase their voting power and influence
over director elections and other important corporate matters.6 Not only have
shareholders been voting, but they also have been voting against management

1

See infra Part I (discussing rational apathy of dispersed public shareholders).
See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 521
(1990).
3
See ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390-96 (1986) (noting that coordination costs for
dispersed shareholders create rational apathy); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 395 (1983) (suggesting that dispersed
shareholders are rationally apathetic because their individual votes will not likely make a
difference); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem
of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 46 (1988); Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of
Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1169 (2013) (noting that “dispersed shareholders were rationally
apathetic”).
4
See Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1746 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]; Stephen
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 547, 558-60 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, The Means and Ends]; William W. Bratton
& Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
653, 659-60 (2010).
5
This Article will use the terms “shareholder” and “public company shareholder”
interchangeably to refer to public (as distinct from private) company shareholders.
6
See LISA FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
AND PARTICIPATION 3-4 (2011).
2
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preferences.7 Moreover, shareholders increasingly have begun to request, and in
some instances demand, that corporate officers and directors engage with them
around a range of issues.8
The shift away from shareholder apathy reflects a radical departure from the
traditional corporate governance norm. While many corporate governance
experts have conceded the descriptive shift away from shareholder apathy (at
least temporarily),9 few have acknowledged the normative shift and its related
significance. This Article acknowledges that shift, and in so doing advances
three important claims related to shareholders and the corporate governance
landscape. First, this Article maintains that increased shareholder activism
reflects a considerable descriptive shift in the manner in which shareholders use
their voting power to engage with the corporation. Second, and more
importantly, this Article asserts that such increased activism reflects a normative
shift pursuant to which shareholders, corporate officers, and directors have come
to believe that shareholder activism is normatively appropriate, at least to a
certain extent and for certain shareholders. In light of the long-held belief in the
viability and validity of shareholder apathy, this shift is remarkable. Third, this
Article argues that, even if efforts to scale back shareholder activism gain some
traction, those efforts will prove challenging and may be doomed to failure
because of the normative shift embracing shareholder activism as an appropriate
element of corporate governance. Shareholder activism is the new corporate
governance norm; as a consequence, it likely will remain a fixture of corporate
governance in the future.
This Article does not seek to respond to the debate regarding the propriety of
shareholder activism. Considerable ink has been spent on that endeavor. This
Article also does not seek to pinpoint or otherwise assess why shareholders have
become more active, though this Article would assert that the rise in activism
stems from multiple factors including an increase in hedge fund activism, the
increased dominance of institutional shareholders in the public sphere, and
corporate scandals that have not only focused attention on public company
goverance, but also raised concerns about traditonal corporte governance norms.
However, this Article does assert that shareholder activist proponents do appear
7
See infra Part II (discussing rise of shareholder voting and willingness to reject director
preferences).
8
Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 821,
822; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 2018: BOARD
SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT IN THE NEW INVESTOR ENVIRONMENT 3, 9 (2018); Deloitte,
Shareholder Engagement: A New Era in Corporate Governance, WALL STREET J.: RISK &
COMPLIANCE J. (Oct. 1, 2013, 12:01 AM), https://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/1
0/01/shareholder-engagement-a-new-era-in-corporate-governance/.
9
See NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., DIRECTOR ESSENTIALS: PREPARING THE BOARD FOR
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 1 (2018), https://www.nacdonline.org/files/NACD%20Director%20
Essentials%20Preparing%20the%20Board%20for%20Shareholder%20Activism%20Executi
ve%20Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/ASA7-QCX9] (referring to year-round shareholder
activism as new norm in American boardrooms).
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to have convinced the corporate community that activism is preferable to apathy
at least for some shareholders.
Part I explores the concept of shareholder apathy and the traditional consensus
related to the reality and propriety of such apathy. Part II details the descriptive
shift from apathy to activism. Part III demonstrates the manner in which the
descriptive shift reflects a normative acceptance of shareholder activism. It
begins by pinpointing the manner in which a broad spectrum of shareholders has
come to accept the shareholder activism norm. Part III then demonstrates how
corporate words and behavior reflect an embrace of the notion that shareholder
activism is appropriate and in the best interests of the corporation. Indeed,
corporate officers and directors not only have voluntarily implemented sweeping
changes to corporate governance practices and policies, but also have actively
sought to engage with shareholders in an effort to incorporate shareholder
concerns into their business practices and plans. Importantly, as they engage in
such behaviors, corporate officers and directors have expressed their belief that
shareholder activism, in the form of shareholder influence and engagement, is
in the corporation’s best interests. In these ways, corporate officers and directors
have demonstrated a normative acceptance of shareholder activism, coupled
with a rejection of the apathy norm.
Part III then grapples with arguments against such acceptance. Some may
disagree with this Article’s thesis based on the notion that directors have
acquiesced to shareholder demands because they feel pressured, coerced, or even
blackmailed,10 and thus may insist that such acquiescence cannot be construed
as any form of agreement or acceptance of shareholder activism. Others may
disagree based on the notion that directors’ behavior reflects a strategic decision,
such as a preemptive strike or a cost-benefit analysis, rather than acceptance or
agreement. Still others may disagree based on the claim that directors have only
embraced the propriety of shareholder influence rhetorically, and hence
directors’ words should be understood as a form of window-dressing rather than
any actual belief. However, after careful consideration of directors’ behaviors,
directors’ disclosures in proxy statements and other public documents, and
directors’ understanding of their fiduciary duties, this Article refutes those
arguments and instead insists that directors’ words and behaviors can and should
be understood as an embrace of the appropriateness of shareholder activism. Part
IV addresses the implications of that embrace, especially in light of regulatory
10
See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 1907, 1922 (2013) (noting that majority voting has “swept the field with boards caving
in to shareholder demands”); see also JAMES MACGREGOR, ABERNATHY MACGREGOR GRP.
INC., SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM ISN’T ALWAYS A GOOD THING 1 (2014),
[https://perma.cc/3GZD-A4EB] (claiming that shareholders have been allowed to hijack the
corporation); SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2014 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 6 (2014),
http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2014_Proxy_Season_Revi
ew.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C35-26U9] (suggesting that some corporate changes may result
from coercion).
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efforts and private ordering mechanisms aimed at reducing shareholder
influence and participation.
I.

THE SHAREHOLDER APATHY TRADITON

Conventional wisdom maintained that shareholders of public companies were
rationally apathetic. This term encompassed two concepts: one descriptive and
one normative. From a descriptive perspective, shareholder apathy encompasses
the long-held understanding that voter turnout among public company
shareholders was relatively low and that when shareholders bothered to vote,
they most often voted in lock-step with management.11 Commentators viewed
this decision to vote with management as a reflection of shareholder apathy
because it appeared to reflect a conscious choice to simply rubber-stamp the
preferences of management rather than actively engage.12 Shareholder apathy
also was reflected in shareholders’ lack of desire to engage with corporate
officers and directors. Instead, shareholders appeared content to remain inactive
and essentially voiceless in the corporate enterprise.13
From a normative perspective, both shareholders and corporate actors viewed
shareholder apathy as “rational” and normatively appropriate. Appropriate not
only because the problems associated with voting by a dispersed group of
potentially uninformed and inexperienced shareholders made shareholder
activism undesirable, but also because of the strong preference for granting
presumably more experienced and informed directors and officers broad
discretion to make business decisions free of interference from shareholders and
other constituents. This Part unpacks both the descriptive and normative
concepts embedded in shareholder apathy.
A.

The Descriptive Case for Shareholder Apathy

From a descriptive standpoint, shareholder apathy was reflected in a variety
of ways. First, voter turnout among public company shareholders was relatively
low.14 Corporate statutes grant shareholders the power to vote in director
elections and other fundamental transactions.15 However, it has been understood
that, at least historically, most public company shareholders did not exercise
their vote, particularly in director elections.16 This understanding stemmed from
the general presumption that shareholders in public companies are dispersed and
11

See Black, supra note 2, at 521.
Id.
13
See Stout, supra note 3, at 1169.
14
See id.
15
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 242(b), 251(c) (2019) (describing director
elections, charter amendmens, and merger or consolidation respectively); MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT §§ 7.28, 10.03, 10.20(B), 11.04 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (same).
16
See Black, supra note 2, at 521; Gordon, supra note 3, at 46 (noting shareholder apathy
reflected in low shareholder engagement on a range of issues); Stout, supra note 3, at 1169.
12
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hold relatively small amounts of shares, decreasing the likelihood that such
shareholders would be incentivized to vote.17
Second, even when shareholders did vote, they rarely used their vote to
challenge directors.18 This rarity was reflected in both uncontested and contested
elections. With respect to uncontested elections, shareholders rarely voted
against incumbent directors.19 Courts and corporate governance experts have
referred to shareholder voting power, particularly in director elections, as
quintessential and the most important power in the shareholders’ arsenal.20 The
fact that shareholders simply rubber-stamped management choices in director
elections therefore was viewed as a significant indicator of their apathy.21 In
addition, shareholders did not engage in many election contests—referred to as
proxy contests in the public company context.22 On those rare occasions when
shareholders engaged in proxy contests, they seldom were successful.23 To be
sure, the lack of success in such contests could reflect shareholder satisfaction
with incumbent directors and officers or lack of satisfaction with the dissident
slate. Nevertheless, commentators viewed the low level of proxy contests

17
See Stout, supra note 3, at 1169 (asserting that shareholders do not pay attention or even
vote because “[w]hat made the public corporation ‘public’ of course, was that it had thousands
or even hundreds of thousands of shareholders, none of whom owned more than a small
fraction of outstanding shares”); Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder,
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 417 (2006) (“It is common knowledge that individual
shareholders generally are not interested in—or, at least not capable of—exercising their
control rights effectively.”).
18
See Black, supra note 2, at 526-27; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 310 (1999) (referring to rational
apathy as leading shareholders to “vote for whomever and whatever management
recommends” (quoting CLARK, supra note 3, at 94)); Stout, supra note 3, at 1169.
19
See Black, supra note 2, at 526-27; Stout, supra note 3, at 1169.
20
See EMAK Worldwide, Inc. v. Kurz, 50 A.3d 429, 433 (Del. 2012) (“Shareholder voting
rights are sacrosanct. The fundamental governance right possessed by shareholders is the
ability to vote for the directors the shareholder wants to oversee the firm.”); Pell v. Kill, 135
A.3d 764, 793 (Del. Ch. 2016) (noting that denial of shareholders’ right to vote causes
irreparable harm); Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 732 A.2d 1180, 1193 (Del. Ch. 1998) (noting
that “the shareholder vote has primacy in our system of corporate governance”); Blasius
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Co., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The shareholder franchise is
the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”); Robert
B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: “Sacred
Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 274 (2001); Velasco, supra note 17, at
411 (“[S]hareholder rights to elect directors and sell shares are indeed fundamental.”).
21
See Black, supra note 2, at 521; Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The
Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599, 1608 (1989) (noting
that crucial premise of shareholder apathy is that “shareholders will consistently vote in
support of management”).
22
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675,
688-89 (2007); Black, supra note 2, at 521.
23
See Black, supra note 2, at 526-27.
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coupled with the slim chance of success as another important indicator of
shareholder apathy.24
Third, shareholders also rarely voted inconsistently with management’s
directives outside of the director election context.25 One important example of
this rarity can be seen through shareholder voting patterns related to shareholder
proposals. Federal law allows shareholders to submit proposals to the
corporation’s proxy statement to be voted upon by other shareholders.26 When
shareholders submit such proposals, management can also recommend whether
they believe shareholders should support the proposals.27 Management almost
always recommends that shareholders vote against shareholder proposals.
Historically, shareholders almost always followed management’s
recommendation, resulting in very few shareholder proposals passing with a
majority vote or otherwise receiving any significant percentage of the
shareholder vote.28 In other words, shareholder proposals almost never received
support from other shareholders.29 By 1981, one commentator had found only
two proposals not supported by management that nevertheless were approved
by shareholders.30 Like uncontested director elections and proxy fights,
shareholders’ decisions not to support shareholder proposals were viewed as a
prime indicator of shareholder apathy, reflecting shareholders’ preference for
simply rubber-stamping the choices of management and thus avoiding
meaningful exercise of the vote.31
Finally, shareholders did not seek out engagement with corporate officers and
directors. Historically, shareholders did not submit many shareholder
proposals.32 Because most public company shareholders were dispersed and thus
did not attend the annual meeting in person, shareholder proposals are one of the
24

See id. at 521, 526-27. As Professor Bernard Black has noted, the rarity of successful
proxy fights epitomized the modern symbol of shareholder apathy. Id.
25
See Gordon, supra note 3, at 46.
26
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2018); Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A
Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 879 (1994).
27
See Palmiter, supra note 26, at 922.
28
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revitalizing SEC Rule 14a-8’s Ordinary Business
Exclusion: Preventing Shareholder Micromanagement by Proposal, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
705, 709 (2016); Myron P. Curzan & Mark L. Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate Democracy:
Control of Investment Managers’ Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 670, 676 (1980); Palmiter, supra note 26, at 883.
29
See Andrew R. Brownstein & Igor Kirman, Can a Board Say No When Shareholders
Say Yes? Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions, 60 BUS. LAW. 23, 27 (2004); Susan W.
Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REV. 425, 426
(1984); Palmiter, supra note 26, at 883.
30
See Liebeler, supra note 29, at 426.
31
See Black, supra note 2, at 527 (noting that shareholder passivity was reflected in low
levels of support for shareholder proposals).
32
See id. at 527, 584 (noting historical rarity of shareholder proposals); Brownstein &
Kirman, supra note 29, at 26.
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principal ways in which public company shareholders engage with
management.33 Indeed, while such proposals are generally nonbinding,
shareholder proposals reflect one of the only ways in which shareholders (as
opposed to officers and directors) can encourage the corporation to adopt some
measure or take some action.34 Thus, shareholder proposals can be used by
shareholders to actively engage with management and to actively seek to
influence managerial and corporate policies.35 Hence, shareholder proposals are
often used as a marker for activism or the lack thereof.36 The fact that historically
only a small subset of shareholders submitted proposals, and that they were not
submitted in very large numbers, was another indicator of shareholders’ lack of
activism and thus apathy.37
Shareholders also did not seek out engagement opportunities beyond the
shareholder proposal process. Indeed, historically, the idea of shareholder
engagement was virtually nonexistent.38 Instead, except in very rare
circumstances, neither shareholders nor corporate actors had any expectation
that shareholders would seek out engagement opportunities, or that corporate
actors would seek to engage with their shareholders.39 The fact that shareholders
were not interested in engagement, or otherwise expected to engage,
underscored their apathy.
B.

Apathy as THE Governance Norm

Most in the corporate community viewed shareholder apathy as rational.
Several reasons were advanced to support this view. Perhaps the most cited
reasons have been collective action and free riding problems. The collective
action problem refers to the notion that, because of their dispersed nature, public
company shareholders find it difficult to act collectively and thus find it difficult
to ensure that their votes would have any meaningful impact on outcomes.40 This
difficulty makes it rational for such shareholders to refrain from dedicating the
time or resources to become more active.41 The free rider problem relates to the
notion that other shareholders would be able to “free ride” off of any shareholder
33

See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 63-64; Palmiter, supra note 26, at 884.
See Palmiter, supra note 26, at 883-84.
35
See id.
36
See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 63-64.
37
See Black, supra note 2, at 527.
38
See Fairfax, supra note 8, at 830.
39
See id.
40
See CLARK, supra note 3, at 390-96; Gordon, supra note 3, at 43; Velasco, supra note
17, at 417.
41
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 395 (suggesting that dispersed shareholders
are rationally apathetic because their individual votes will not likely make a difference);
Gordon, supra note 3, at 46 (describing high costs and low benefits of shareholders’ active
engagement); Stout, supra note 3, at 1169 (noting that dispersed shareholders were rationally
apathetic); Velasco, supra note 17, at 417.
34
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efforts aimed at devoting the resources to become informed about particular
issues to be voted upon.42 In this regard, the costs of voting, or of voting in an
informed manner, were significantly outweighed by any benefits to be
obtained.43 Taken together, collective action and free riding problems explained
the rationality of shareholder apathy, demonstrating why it made sense that
shareholders have no incentive to devote the time or resources to engage in the
voting process.
Most also viewed this apathy as normatively appropriate. Such a view
primarily stemmed from a preference in favor of directors making business
decisions without influence from shareholders. Such a preference was two-fold.
On the one hand, shareholder influence was undesirable for many reasons.
Public company shareholders suffer from informational asymmetries because
they generally are not involved in the day-to-day affairs of the company and thus
have limited knowledge of corporate affairs.44 They also are not in the best
position to gain needed information about the company and its operations, and
otherwise may not have the requisite knowledge or expertise to make informed
voting decisions.45 Then too, shareholders may be motivated by their personal
interests or interests unrelated to corporate ones, particularly because
shareholders typically have no fiduciary duty to act in the corporation’s best
interests.46 Each of these reasons renders shareholder activism undesirable.
Importantly, both corporate actors and shareholders embraced the
appropriateness of shareholder apathy. Directors and officers clearly viewed
shareholder apathy as preferable to shareholder activism or influence. Based on
this view, directors and officers also saw shareholder engagement as
unnecessary and unwarranted. Consistent with this view, Professor Bernard
Black notes that proponents of shareholder apathy viewed the shareholder
proposal process with “disdain,” not only because it was irrational to think that
shareholders would use the process, but also because any use would be
42

See Black, supra note 2, at 528 (“Free-rider problems work in tandem with the rational
apathy of the free riders to discourage shareholder proposals from being made.”); Blair &
Stout, supra note 18, at 310 (noting that free rider problem tended to inspire rational apathy);
Gordon, supra note 3, at 44, 46 (discussing free rider problem in the context of shareholder
opposition to management decisions).
43
See Gordon, supra note 3, at 43. But see Romano, supra note 21, at 1611 (noting that
rational apathy story greatly overstates the cost of becoming informed).
44
See Gordon, supra note 3, at 11-12 (discussing information asymmetry rationale as
justification for managerial control in the context of dual-class stock).
45
See George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor
Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 105, 133 (2010).
46
See Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO
ST. L.J. 53, 101 (2008); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate
Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 831 (1993). Courts have recognized a
duty for shareholders only as it relates to majority or controlling shareholders. See Iman
Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fidicary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255,
1266 (2008).
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ineffective and likely a nuisance.47 Shareholders appear to have a similar
disdain, reflecting their agreement with the apathy norm. The lack of shareholder
support for shareholder proposals could be viewed as their embrace of the belief
that they do not find it appropriate for other shareholders to seek to influence
important corporate matters. In this regard, the historical lack of support for such
proposals may be a reflection of shareholders’ normative rejection of
shareholder activism. Moreover, shareholders’ voting behaviors were viewed as
their endorsement of shareholder apathy as a normative preference.48
The other rationale supporting a normative preference for shareholder apathy
stemmed from the notion that directors and officers are better positioned than
shareholders to make decisions on behalf of the corporation.49 Unlike
shareholders, directors not only have a duty to act in the corporation’s best
interests,50 but also have the necessary knowledge and expertise to take such
actions. Moreover, for those who believe that corporations should focus on
maximizing the interests of all of their constituents, directors and officers are
better positioned to engage in such focus, while shareholders may vote in a way
that furthers their own personal interests without regard to other shareholders or
other corporate stakeholders.51 Shareholder apathy was embraced as the
appropriate corporate governance norm because shareholder power was
problematic while director power was sacrosanct.
C.

The Naysayers

To be sure, there was never universal consensus around the conventional
wisdom of rational shareholder apathy either as a descriptive or normative
matter.52 From a descriptive standpoint, Professor Roberta Romano notes that
the characterization of shareholders as rationally apathetic involves “strong and
47

See Black, supra note 2, at 527.
See id. (describing rationally apathetic shareholder with little interest in voting); Stout,
supra note 3, at 1180 (noting that investors have “eagerly” bought shares in companies
structured to have weak shareholder rights); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of
Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 803 (2007) (noting that shareholders prefer weak
voting rights).
49
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
50
See supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also Blair & Stout, supra note 18, at 29394 (noting that while it has become commonplace to describe directors’ duties as being owed
to shareholders, case law makes it clear that directors’ duties are owed to the corporation
itself).
51
See Blair & Stout, supra note 18, at 304-05; Stout, supra note 3, at 1170-71 (noting that
Berle and Means “were not troubled” by shareholder apathy because they thought it more
essential that directors and officers be allowed to run the public company for the benefit of
employees, consumers and the broader society, in addition to shareholders).
52
See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264 (1992); Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good:
Reassessing the Scope of Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with
Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409, 430 (2002).
48
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questionable assumptions concerning investor behavior.”53 Along these lines,
several scholars have noted that the rational apathy theory was developed by
political scientists to explain why people do not vote in political elections, not
why they vote in a particular way—which is how many scholars have used the
theory in the corporate governance context.54 In other words, is it truly accurate
to characterize shareholders’ decisions to vote with management as an indicator
of apathy? Some have argued that while rational apathy can be used to explain
situations in which shareholders refrain from voting, it cannot be used to explain
shareholders’ decisions to vote and to vote in a particular manner.55 Thus, many
resisted the claim that shareholders’ voting behavior reflected “rational apathy.”
Such scholars pointed to evidence appearing to refute shareholder apathy
related to voting. This evidence stemmed not only from the fact that shareholders
voted (regardless of how that vote was aligned), but also from the fact that, in
some circumstances, shareholders voted against management.56 In fact, federal
law requires some institutions to disclose their voting criteria.57 Such a
requirement has resulted in increased voting by many institutional
shareholders.58
Then too, many contended that shareholders’ so-called apathy stemmed from
legal impediments rather than an affirmative decision to refrain from voting.59
As one scholar asserted, the rational apathy story assumes a “benign legal
environment” pursuant to which “shareholders are passive despite legal
efforts.”60 Instead, shareholders are “hobbled by a complex web of legal rules”
that make it difficult for them to be active.61 In this regard, shareholder apathy
stemmed from legal restraints rather than shareholder preference.62
Scholars also insisted that the changing shareholder landscape undercut the
shareholder apathy narrative. Indeed, the shareholder landscape has evolved
from one in which individual or retail shareholders hold most of the outstanding
public shares to one in which institutions are the dominant public company

53

See Romano, supra note 21, at 1608.
See Peter N. Flocos, Toward a Liability Rule Approach to the “One Share, One Vote”
Controversy: An Epitaph for the SEC’s Rule 19c-4?, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1761, 1792 (1990);
Romano, supra note 21, at 1608.
55
See Romano, supra note 21, at 1608.
56
See id. at 1608-09.
57
Tamara C. Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivaton and New Governance, 38 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 789, 805 (2014).
58
See id.
59
See Black, supra note 2, at 608 (pinpointing legal barriers, agenda control, and conflicts
of interests as rationales for shareholder voting behavior).
60
See id. at 523.
61
See id.
62
See id. at 524-25.
54
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shareholders.63 The growth of institutional shareholders has meant that share
ownership is no longer dispersed. Instead, institutions hold large shares of public
company stock, and such institutions hold shares in a significant number of
public companies.64 As shareholders become less disperse, the presumption that
their apathy is rational becomes less persuasive.
Scholars also disagreed with the notion that apathy was the preferable
corporate governance norm. Such scholars instead insisted that shareholder
activism served a crucial accountability function, and thus was needed to check
the behavior of directors and officers.65 This disagreement with the normative
preference for shareholder apathy has been a long-standing and consistent
feature of the corporate governance landscape and discourse.66
Regardless of this disagreement, even opponents of the shareholder apathy
norm acknowledge the traditional dominance of that norm.67 Thus, as Professor
Black emphasizes, most modern corporate scholars on either side of the apathy
norm debate accept the dominance of the shareholder apathy norm.68 In addition,
even as public share ownership became less disperse and thus apathy appeared
less rational, the cultural norm favoring apathy ensured that public company
shareholders also remained wedded to the view that shareholder apathy was the
most acceptable and appropriate governance norm.69
II.

ACTIVISM AS THE NEW NORMAL

This decade has witnessed a significant shift away from shareholder apathy
both in a descriptive and normative manner. In a descriptive manner, this shift
is reflected in a wave of actions that signal increased shareholder activism and
influence. To be sure, individual shareholders, also referred to as retail investors,
have not been caught in this wave. Instead, retail investors have continued to be
apathetic even as institutional shareholder activism has increased significantly.70
This Article acknowledges that the lack of increased activism by retail investors

63

See id. at 524-25, 567-69; Melissa Sawyer & Marc Trevino, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP,
Review and Analysis of 2017 U.S. Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 10, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/10/revie
w-and-analysis-of-2017-u-s-shareholder-activism [https://perma.cc/8Y96-45NG] (noting
that concentration of ownership continues to rise).
64
See Black, supra note 2, at 567-69; Sawyer & Trevino, supra note 63.
65
See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 37-39; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 870 (2005).
66
See supra note 65.
67
See Black, supra note 2, at 528 (noting that shareholder apathy is “widely accepted” by
both sides of the debate related to its appropriateness).
68
See id. at 522.
69
See id. at 523, 532, 563-64.
70
See Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution
to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 60-61, 66 (2016).
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is cause for concern.71 However, the lack of activism by retail investors does not
negate this Article’s thesis, given that institutional shareholders dominate the
public shareholder landscape,72 and that institutional shareholder activism has
clearly increased. Of note, this Article uses the term “activism” to refer to
activites aimed at increasing shareholder influence and power over the
coporation.
A.

Shareholder Campaigns to Enhance Voting Power

Shareholders have strenuously campaigned to increase their voting power,
particularly with respect to director elections. This Section will focus on such
campaigns related to majority voting, board declassification, proxy access, and
supermajority voting. While there has been significant debate related to the
merits and benefits of these campaigns,73 those who waged such campaigns
viewed them as critical for enhancing shareholders’ voting power and
influence.74 More importantly for purposes of this Article’s thesis, the mere
existence and vigor of such campaigns are remarkable because they fly in the
face of the notion that shareholders would not seek to use—let alone enhance—
their voting power. Thus, these campaigns highlight the shift away from
shareholder apathy.
1.

Majority Voting

One critical element of shareholder activism has been the majority voting
campaign. In 2005, shareholders began advocating in earnest for majority voting
to replace the rule of plurality voting in director elections.75 Plurality voting
refers to a system whereby directors are elected so long as they receive a
plurality or most of the favorable votes cast, without regard to withheld votes or
votes cast against them.76 Under such a rule, in an uncontested election it would
be possible for a director to be elected even if the overwhelming majority of
shareholders withheld their votes against the director, because the plurality
regime ensures that such a director is elected so long as she receives at least one
vote in her favor.77 By contrast, majority voting ties director election results to

71

See id. at 57, 69, 70-73.
See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 46-47.
73
See id. at 37-39. Compare Bebchuk, supra note 65, at 913-14 (arguing for increased
shareholder power), with Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 4, at 558-60
(suggesting that corporate directors are in best position to manage public companies), and
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4, at 659 (“[Corporate directors] are better informed than the
shareholders and thus better positioned to take responsibility for both monitoring and
managing the firm and its externalities.”).
74
See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 37-39.
75
See Fairfax, supra note 46, at 65-66.
76
Id. at 63-64.
77
See id.
72
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obtaining a majority of the shareholder vote.78 Shareholders viewed plurality
voting as undermining director accountability and shareholders’ ability to
impact election outcomes.79 Spurred by this view, in 2005, shareholders began
mobilizing to replace plurality voting with majority voting by filing a record
number of shareholder proposals on the issue.80 Those proposals quickly began
averaging fifty percent or more shareholder support.81 Shareholders’ efforts to
dismantle plurality voting exemplify the new era of shareholder activism.
2.

Board Declassification

Another critical element of shareholder activism has been aimed at board
declassification. Board declassification refers to efforts to eliminate classified or
staggered boards—that is, boards in which only a percentage of directors are
elected each year—and replace them with boards that are elected annually.82
Shareholders consider classified boards to be an entrenchment mechanism
aimed at undermining their voting power by weakening their ability to replace
the entire board in one election cycle.83 Shareholders and their advocates
vigorously pushed for board declassification.84 The average shareholder support
for board declassification has topped fifty percent for over a decade (and has
often averaged close to seventy to eighty percent of the shareholder vote).85 Like
majority voting, shareholders’ efforts to enact annual elections not only

78
There are essentially two forms of majority voting regimes. See id. at 64-66. In a “true
majority voting” regime, director nominees must receive a majority of the shareholder vote
to be elected. See id. at 64. Under a “plurality plus” regime, plurality voting remains the
default, but when a director fails to receive a majority of the vote, she must tender her
resignation, and the board has some period of time (typically ninety days) to determine if it
will accept the resignation. See id. at 65.
79
See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 88-90; Fairfax, supra note 46, at 63.
80
See Fairfax, supra note 46, at 61-70.
81
See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 90; SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 10, at 5.
82
See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 80.
83
See Fairfax, supra note 8, at 828.
84
One pivotal board declassification advocate has been Harvard Professor Lucian
Bebcheck. Professor Behchuck established the Shareholder Rights Project, a clinical and
academic program at Harvard Law School that worked with insitutional investors to submit
close to two hundred shareholder proposals aimed at dismantling classified boards. See K.J.
Cremers & Simone Sepe, Board Declassification Activism: The Financial Value of the
Shareholder Rights Project 6-8 (June 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstra
ct=2962162. The strength of this advocacy work is highlighted not only by its success, but
also by the fact that in 2015, once the Shareholder Rights Project stopped submitting
proposals, the number of submissions declined significantly. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL
LLP, 2015 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 9 (2015), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publicat
ions/SC_Publication_2015_Proxy_Season_Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/R32B-FZMQ].
85
See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 81; SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2018 PROXY SEASON
REVIEW 21 (2018), https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-2018-Proxy-Seas
on-Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V54-XRNV].
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highlight their desire to make boards more accountable to shareholders, but also
symbolize shareholders’ willingness to abandon apathy.
3. Supermajority Voting
Supermajority voting refers to rules that require that certain fundamental
transactions receive more than a simple majority shareholder vote in order to be
approved. Shareholders view these rules as inhibiting their voting power.
Shareholders contend that dismantling supermajority vote rules will give them a
greater voice in critical corporate actions including amendments to the charter
and bylaws, removal of directors, and approval of fundamental transactions such
as mergers and acquisitions.86
Thus, shareholders have sought to displace supermajority rules with those that
would enable such transactions to be approved with a simple majority vote.
Proposals related to supermajority rules have been very popular and have
garnered significant shareholder support. As one commentator noted, “When
these proposals come to vote, they usually pass.”87 Thus, shareholder support
for altering supermajority votes averaged seventy-three percent in 2018,
seventy-four percent in 2017, and sixty percent in 2016.88
Board declassification, majority voting, and supermajority proposals have
been the three most common shareholder proposals, as well as the three
proposals most likely to garner significant shareholder support.89 The strength
and success of campaigns related to such proposals reflect the growing trend
toward embracing shareholder activism over apathy.
4.

Proxy Access

Many shareholders and their advocates have long viewed proxy access (a rule
that would enable shareholders to nominate candidates of their choice on the
corporation’s proxy statement) as pivotal to shareholders’ ability to
meaningfully exercise their voting power.90 Thus, shareholders have sought
proxy access for decades.91 In the past, federal law prohibited shareholders from
using the shareholder proposal process to advance proxy access.92 However, in
2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) passed two proxy
access rules—one that mandated proxy access and one that allowed shareholders
86

See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 84, at 21.
See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2017 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 11 (2017), https://www.
sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2017_Proxy_Season_Review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ADU2-U75D].
88
Id.; SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 85, at 21.
89
See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 85, at 22; SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP,
supra note 10, at 5.
90
See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 130.
91
See id.
92
See id. at 128.
87
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to submit proxy access shareholder proposals.93 The Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit overturned the mandated proxy access rule, but left untouched the
SEC rule allowing shareholders to submit proxy access bylaws.94 Beginning in
2015, proxy access became the most popular shareholder proposal submitted,
with the number of submissions skyrocketing by over four hundred percent from
2014 to 2105.95 By 2017, proxy access had become the most prominent of
shareholder proposals and the proposal that received the highest level of
majority support.96 Thus, it received average shareholder support of fifty-eight
percent in 2017, fifty-one percent of the vote in 2016,97 and fifty-five perent in
2015.98 By 2018, the number of proxy access proposals had dropped due
primarily to the “widespread and continued adoption of proxy access bylaws at
larger companies.”99
B.

Votes Against Managerial Preferences

To the extent that the hallmark of shareholder apathy is shareholders’
overwhelming tendency to vote in a manner consistent with managerial
preferences, shareholders have recently rebuked that hallmark in several ways.
First, there has been a rise in shareholder willingness to reject directors. This
includes an increase in the number of directors against whom shareholders
withhold their vote, 100 as well as an increase in the number of directors who
receive less than a majority of the vote.101 To be sure, the overall percentage of
directors who do not receive an overwhelming majority of the shareholder vote
remains relatively small.102 Some have construed this to mean that majority
voting has no impact or otherwise that shareholders are not willing to exercise

93

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2018); FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 131, 136-37.
See Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
95
See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 84, at 4.
96
See GIBSON DUNN, SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE 2018 PROXY
SEASON 4-6 (2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/shareholderproposal-developments-during-the-2018-proxy-season.pdf [https://perma.cc/JXT3-UUFH].
97
See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 87, at 6.
98
See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 84, at 4.
99
See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 85, at 16.
100
See Proxy Insight, Board of the Dead, PROXY MONTHLY, Nov. 2017, at 7; KOSMAS
PAPADOPULOS, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., AN EARLY LOOK AT THE US 2018 PROXY
SEASON TRENDS 2 (2018), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/early-look-usproxy-season-trends.pdf?elqTrackId=7846f924a48945b3a09d4b10a6fcbde9&elq=9327df5b
6e4b48bfbef2644dc687e188&elqaid=1192&elqat=1&elqCampaignId= [https://perma.cc/Q7
LP-XHGQ].
101
See Proxy Insight, supra note 100, at 7.
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See id.
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their voting authority.103 However, the mere fact that shareholders are willing to
defy management—even if in only a handful of cases—underscores their
activism. Then too, the data related to director elections could indicate
shareholders’ judicious use of their director election power, rather than an
unwillingness to use it.104 Second, there has been a rise in proxy contests coupled
with a rise in shareholder support of those contests, and hence in shareholder
success in such contests.105 Commentators characterized the historical lack of
proxy contests and shareholder support for those contests as a key symbol of
shareholder apathy. By sharp contrast, the growth in proxy contests and the
related growth in the success of such contests is a strong indicator of activism.
Third, there has been a rise in shareholder support of shareholder proposals.106
As Section II.A revealed, many shareholder proposals have begun receiving a
majority of the shareholder vote, with some votes being well in excess of a
simple majority. This rise is a critical signal of activism. The vast majority of
shareholder proposals are accompanied by a recommendation from the board to
vote against the proposal. Shareholders’ willingness to ignore that
recommendation runs counter to the apathy narrative, highlighting the shift away
from that narrative.

103
See Stephen Choi et al., Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1122, 1128 (2016); William K. Sjostrom & Young Kim, Majority Voting
for the Election of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 469 (2007).
104
See Choi et al., supra note 103, at 1132-33, 1173 (discussing shareholder restraint
hypothesis and evidence of shareholder restraint); Sjostrom & Kim, supra note 103, at 46869 (“This real risk of losing the election would in turn ‘make directors more accountable to
shareholders.’”).
105
See Activist Insight, Taking Care of Business: A Look at Shareholder Activism in 2014
and Beyond, in ACTIVIST INVESTING: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM 8, 11 (2015), http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/20150130_Activis
tInsight-SRZ.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YN8-BX7S] (discussing record number of activist
campaigns in 2014); Martin Lipton, Watchell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Some Thoughts for
Boards of Directors in 2015, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 2,
2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/12/02/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in2015/ [https://perma.cc/5HML-3NPZ] (noting that “[t]he number of activist attacks has
surged from 27 in 2000 to nearly 250 year-to-date in 2014, in addition to numerous
undisclosed behind-the-scenes situations”); Warren S. de Wied, Proxy Contests, PRAC. L.J.,
Nov. 2010, at 32, 33, https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/dewied1110.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X7DZ-F2RW] (noting that over the past ten years there has been an eightyseven percent increase in frequency of proxy contests); see also LAZARD’S S’HOLDER
ADVISORY GRP., 2017 ACTIVISM YEAR IN REVIEW 2 (2018), https://www.lazard.com/media/
450414/lazards-review-of-shareholder-activism-q4-2017pdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GDE545AP]; Anthony Garcia, In Proxy Voting, Public Disclosures Often Lead to Private
Agreements, FACTSET INSIGHT (Jan. 5, 2015), https://insight.factset.com/in-proxy-votingpublic-disclosures-often-lead-to-private-agreements [https://perma.cc/R3JC-WX5Q]
(showing general rise in proxy fights and a “high watermark” in 2009).
106
See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 96, at 1 (noting that average support for proposals has
increased almost four percentage points).
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Engagement Activities

Shareholders’ lack of engagement, coupled with their apparent lack of interest
in engagement, has been replaced by increased calls for engagement. This
replacement is yet another indicator of the demise of shareholder apathy.
1.

Shareholder Proposals

In contrast to the apathy era in which very few shareholder proposals were
submitted or supported, there has been a steady growth in this area. In the last
decade, shareholders have submitted a record number of corporate governance
proposals aimed at enhancing their influence over director elections and
corporate affairs.107 Moreover, there has been significant growth in shareholder
support for those proposals.108
2. Beyond Proposals
There also has been a steady rise in shareholder calls for increased
engagement with the board and officers outside of the proposal process and the
annual meeting.109 Studies reveal that twenty-five years ago, the topic of
shareholder communication outside of the limited platform of shareholder
proposals had not yet surfaced.110 By comparison, current interactions between

107
Over the last decade, there have been several years where the total number of
shareholder proposals filed reached record highs. Even as the overall number of proposals
have declined in the last two or three years, shareholder support for such proposals has
increased. See id. at 2. A record high volume of shareholder proposals was reached in 2008
and 2009; 2012 and 2013 also showed an increased volume. See EY CTR. FOR BD. MATTERS,
LET’S TALK: GOVERNANCE: 2014 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 6 (July 2014), http://www.ey.com/
Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-proxy-season-review/$FILE/ey-proxy-season-review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7AW3-XSQC] (noting in recent years the number of shareholder proposals
submissions have been at an “all-time high”); Matteo Tonello, The Conference Bd., Proxy
Voting Analytics (2009-2013), HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept.
26, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/09/26/proxy-voting-analytics-2009-2013/
[https://perma.cc/UM9S-7MYD]; Matteo Tonello, The Conference Bd., Proxy Voting
Analytics (2008-2012), HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 24, 2013),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/24/proxy-voting-analytics-2008-2012/ [https://per
ma.cc/D2U5-WJ3A]. There was a slight decline in 2017 and 2018, but there was also an
increase in shareholder support for proposals. See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 96, at 3.
108
See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 96, at 1.
109
See Fairfax, supra note 8, at 833; James Kim & Jason D. Schloetzer, Conference Bd.,
Global Trends in Board-Shareholder Engagement, DIRECTOR NOTES 1 (Oct. 2013),
https://www.conference-board.org/publications/publicationdetail.cfm?publicationid=2618
[https://perma.cc/M3JF-7A4W].
110
See Susan S. Boren et al., Spencer Stuart, Why They Still Do It: Directors’ Motivations
for Joining a Board, POINT OF VIEW: A SPECIAL ISSUE FOCUSING ON TODAY’S BOARD & CEO
AGENDA 5 (2010), https://www.spencerstuart.com/research-and-insight/why-they-still-do-itunderstanding-directors-motivations-for-joining-a-board [https://perma.cc/Y7M3-TVRF].
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shareholders and boards are on the rise.111 Boards report a rising increase in
contact from shareholders regarding specific governance-related topics.112 In
2018, seventy-seven percent of S&P 500 companies disclosed engaging with
shareholders over the previous years, which was up from fifty-six percent in
2015.113 Moreover, director involvement in such engagement has increased. In
2015, less than ten percent of S&P 500 companies indicated that their directors
were involved in engagement efforts with shareholders.114 In 2018, over a
quarter of S&P 500 companies so indicated.115 A 2018 National Association of
Corporate Directors (“NACD”) study found that for the first time, a majority of
their respondents had a board representative meet with institutional shareholders
in the prior year.116 As another study emphasized, “outreach to and direct
engagement with shareholders cements itself as a key feature of the governance
landscape.”117
An NACD report notes that while communications between directors and
shareholders is not a new idea, it has become a new and urgent priority.118
Engagement outside of the annual meeting and shareholder proposal process is
perhaps more remarkable because it reveals that shareholders are not simply
active but are active year-round. The rise in engagement is another indictor of
the shift away from apathy.
*****

111
See SPENCER STUART, 2017: SPENCER STUART U.S. BOARD INDEX 7, 33 (2017),
https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/ssbi2017/ssbi_2017_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JK
5-J3FB] (noting increase of engagement from thirty-nine percent in 2016 to fifty-five percent
in 2017).
112
See id. (noting that fifty-five percent of boards (versus thirty-nine percent in 2016)
reported being contacted by large institional investors or their largest shareholders to discuss
governance related issues).
113
See EY CTR. FOR BD. MATTERS, 2018 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 4 (July 2018), https://ww
w.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-cbm-proxy-season-review-2018/$FILE/EY-cbmproxy-season-review-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8YZ-JK59].
114
See id.
115
See id.; SPENCER STUART, supra note 111, at 34 (noting that many shareholders engage
directly with directors and the CEO, rather than investor relations officer of general counsel).
116
See NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., supra note 8, at 3. Most of those meetings include the
board chair or lead director. See id.
117
See EY CTR. FOR BD. MATTERS, supra note 113, at 4.
118
Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Board-Shareholder Communications,
NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRECTORS (2014), https://www.nacdonline.org/insights/publications.
cfm?ItemNumber=682 [https://perma.cc/BQ7D-WGL7] (“Few priorities are more urgent for
boards today than communicaiton with their shareholders. The need for engagement,
however, is not a recent addition to leading governance issues.”); see also NAT’L ASS’N OF
CORP. DIRS., supra note 8, at 24 (noting that shareholder engagement has evolved to “more
year-round activity”).
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No one can question the fact that public company shareholders today are far
from apathetic. They vote. They vote against management preferences, looking
to unseat directors and alter corporate policies and practices. They engage. They
engage year-round. Shareholder apathy, as a descriptive matter, appears to be
dead. Instead, as the NACD aptly notes, “year-round shareholder activism” is
becoming the “new norm in the American boardroom.”119
III. ACTIVISM AS THE NEW NORM
The descriptive shift has been accompanied by a normative shift.
Shareholders as well as corporate officers and directors have rejected the
propriety of apathy and embraced the appropriateness of activism, at least at
some level and for some shareholders. In other words, shareholder activism has
emerged as the new corporate governance norm. What does this norm
encompass? It encompasses the belief that shareholders should actively engage
with the corporation by using their vote to influence corporate elections and
other corporate governance matters. The norm also encompasses the belief that
shareholders should actively engage with corporations by engaging—and
thereby communicating—with corporate officers and directors on a regular
basis. Both of these beliefs run counter to the apathy norm while symbolizing a
preference for activism.
A.

The Shareholder Shift

The very fact that shareholders not only have engaged in campaigns aimed at
augmenting their voting power, but also have used that voting power to alter
corporate boards, practices and procedures, and to influence corporate policies,
demonstrates a clear shift in shareholders’ normative understanding of their
role.120 Historically, governance experts pointed to the fact that shareholders
were not active as clear evidence that shareholders did not believe that they
ought to be active. In this respect, shareholder apathy itself served as the
compelling evidence that shareholders had a normative preference for apathy. In
this same vein, shareholders’ activism can be viewed as evidence of their
normative preference for such activism.
The historically strong embrace of apathy further underscores this evidence,
making shareholders’ shift towards activism especially remarkable. Evidence
suggested that shareholders continued to embrace the apathy norm even when it

119
Director Essentials: Preparing the Board for Shareholder Activism: Executive
Summary, NAT’L ASS’N CORP. DIRECTORS (2018), https://www.nacdonline.org/insights/publi
cations.cfm?ItemNumber=62968 [https://perma.cc/ASG9-UDWP].
120
Through say on pay, shareholders also have used their ability to vote to influence
corporate packages related to compensation. See Jill Fisch, Darius Palia & Steven Davidoff
Solomon, Is Say on Pay All About Pay? The Impact of Firm Performance, 8 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 101, 102 (2018).
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was no longer rational for them to do so.121 Hence, once institutional
shareholders dominated the public company shareholder landscape,
undermining the extent to which public company shareholders were dispersed,
the narrative of rational apathy based on collective action and free-rider concerns
seemed less sanguine.122 Nevertheless, shareholders remained apathetic. Some
suggested that one reason for this continued embrace of apathy was
shareholders’ continued belief that activism was not normatively appropriate.123
This means that the apathy norm was so powerful that shareholders continued to
embrace it even when such embrace may not have been in their best interests.
From this perspective, shareholders’ embrace of activism in light of the
historical dominance of apathy as the normative preference not only indicates
that shareholders have consciously decided to embrace such activism, but also
that they have consciously made the choice that activism is preferable to apathy.
Shareholders’ desire for engagement with corporate actors is also compelling
evidence of the normative embrace of shareholder activism. Indeed, apathy was
typified by shareholders’ apparent desire to remain voiceless. Consistent with
this desire is the fact that shareholder communication with the corporation in
general, and the board in particular, especially outside of the annual meeting,
was virtually unheard of.124 Now however, shareholder communication with the
corporation has become standard practice: “Shareholders increasingly want to
engage with boards on a range of governance issues, including succession,
compensation, risk oversight and other concerns.”125 Shareholders have
requested, and in some cases demanded, opportunities to interact with directors
and officers.126 The fact that shareholders specifically reach out to corporations
reflects their rejection of apathy and their normative belief that they should be
actively engaging with corporations.
Yet another indicator of the normative acceptance of shareholder activism can
be seen in the rationale for shareholders’ voting behavior in director elections.
To be sure, the fact that shareholders vote in such elections, and that they are
willing to withhold their vote against certain directors, undercuts the apathy
narrative. As mentioned in Section II.B, shareholders continue to vote for most
directors and in large percentages. However, such voting behavior does not
negate the fact that shareholders clearly believe that they should have enhanced
voting rights—as evidenced by their fight to obtain majority voting. Also, it does
not negate the notion that directors may be receiving such strong vote totals
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See Black, supra note 2, at 563-64.
See id. at 563; Romano, supra note 46, at 795, 822.
See Black, supra note 2, at 522.
See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
See SPENCER STUART, supra note 111, at 7 (emphasis added).
See Fairfax, supra note 8, at 822.
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because they are viewed as responsive to shareholders.127 But most telling are
the reasons why shareholders decide to withhold their votes. The primary reason
why shareholders will withhold their vote against directors is directors’
perceived lack of responsiveness to shareholder concerns.128 The percentage of
directors who receive less than a majority support is very low, but it is “relatively
significant” for those directors deemed to be unresponsive to shareholder
concerns.129 Governance experts have noted that shareholders take this issue
“particularly seriously.”130 This suggests that shareholders believe directors
should be responsive to them. Such a belief is incompatible with the notion that
shareholders should be apathetic. Such a belief, therefore, reflects shareholders’
embrace of activism and the appropriateness of shareholder influence.
1. Everybody’s In
Shareholder acceptance of activism is further highlighted by the fact that a
broad spectrum of shareholders has embraced activism. If only a limited number
or type of shareholder were engaging in activism, that fact would undermine the
notion that public shareholders as a group have rejected apathy in favor of
activism.
At first glance, evidence suggests that this may be the case. For example,
shareholder proposals are often submitted by a relatively small group of
shareholders.131 Three individuals are responsible for over forty percent of
shareholder proposal submissions and the vast majority of shareholder
governance-related proposals.132 Moreover, not only are a small number of
entities responsible for shareholder proposal submissions from institutional
shareholders, but also the same type of institutional shareholder—the public
pension fund—submits the large majority of shareholder proposals.133 In this
regard, it could be suggested that focusing on the number of shareholder
proposals as a reflection of activism may be misleading.
However, this suggestion is incorrect. First, shareholder support of
shareholder proposals has risen significantly during this era, with many
proposals receiving a majority and at times well over a majority of shareholder

127
See Choi et al., supra note 103, at 1123, 1130 (disucssing deterrence or accountability
hypothesis); Sjostrom & Kim, supra note 103, at 468-69.
128
See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 87, at 2.
129
See id. at 23 (reporting twenty-three percent of directors received less than majority
support).
130
See id. at 27.
131
See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 85, at 3-4.
132
See id. at 4.
133
See id. For many, the fact that public pension funds submit shareholder proposals may
be viewed as unremarkable because such funds historically have been the primary
shareholders responsible for shareholder proposal submissions.
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support.134 Public pension fund holdings fall well short of a majority. Thus, this
majority support stems from other shareholders within the corporation,
reflecting a broad base of support among all shareholders. Commentators have
concurred that the broad level of support for many shareholder proposals can be
characterized as an increase in traction among other types of institutional
shareholders.135
Second, the fact that other shareholders have made the decision to support the
actions of pension funds is itself a sign of an embrace of activism as an
appropriate corporate governance mechanism. Traditionally, pension fund
activism was viewed with skepticism.136 Shareholders viewed pension funds’
behavior as inappropriate because they were seeking to step out of their
normatively appropriate role and become more active.137 As a consequence,
many shareholders were leery of aligning themselves with pension fund
activism. The fact that shareholders are now willing to align themselves with
activism led by such funds is testament to the fact that more shareholders have
now come to view activism as acceptable and appropriate.
Similarly, some have insisted that activism is limited to hedge funds, whose
activism many view as problematic and unacceptable.138 Indeed, often the main
proponents of proxy contests are hedge funds. Moreover, hedge funds have been
particularly aggressive in this new era of activism, causing companies to engage
in practices that many have suggested are not in the best interests of the
corporation.139 However, similar to the shareholder proposal context, hedge
funds have not acted alone. Instead, they have managed to win proxy contests
and other activist campaigns by garnering the support of other shareholders.
Hence, while hedge funds may have led the charge, the fact that other
shareholders support them is strong evidence for the activism norm. Indeed, the
fact that other shareholders align themselves with shareholders, such as hedge
funds, that have openly and unapologetically embraced the activism norm is very
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strong evidence that other shareholders have begun to view that norm as
beneficial and acceptable.
Then too, the embrace of activism is even more significant because the
shareholders traditionally viewed as most likely to embrace apathy also have
endorsed activism. Today, mutual funds and other asset managers have become
increasingly vocal in their support and affirmation of shareholder activism as an
appropriate governance tool.140 Mutual funds and asset managers were viewed
as shareholders most likely to endorse the apathy norm. However, even these
shareholders have become more active. Moreover, even these shareholders have
affirmatively chosen to align themselves with shareholders, such as hedge funds
and public pension funds, that are viewed as symbolizing the propriety of
activism.141
2.

No More Rubber Stamps?

Another key indicator of the normative acceptance of activism is the fact that
shareholders are willing to go against management and their recommendations.
For many, the sin qua non of shareholder apathy rested in the fact that
shareholders rubber-stamped managerial preferences.142 By contrast,
shareholders today are challenging those preferences. The success of proxy
contests is the most compelling example of this phenomenon because it reflects
shareholders’ willingness to vote against directors. Shareholders’ support of
shareholder proposals also highlights the shareholder activism norm as
shareholders have demonstrated their willingness to repeatedly vote against
management recommendations in very large numbers.
3. Proxy Advisors
Some might say that shareholders’ voting behaviors are not the product of
shareholder choice, but instead reflect the choice of others—proxy advisory
140
See LAZARD’S S’HOLDER ADVISORY GRP., supra note 105, at 1, 9 (noting rise in index
funds’ willingness to support dissidents in proxy fights); SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra
note 85, at 4; Tony Boyd, Larry Fink Says BlackRock Will Take Activism to a ‘Whole New
Level,’ FIN. REV. (Nov. 1, 2017, 5:54 AM), https://www.afr.com/business/larry-fink-saysblackrock-will-take-activism-to-a-whole-new-level-20171031-gzc2lt [https://perma.cc/N3W
8-G5WM]; Daniel Gross, Some Mutual Funds Are Joining the Activist Bandwagon, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/15/business/mut fund/somemutual-funds-are-joining-the-activist-bandwagon.html; Mutual Funds Joining Shareholder
Activists in New Trend, VALUEWALK (Aug. 10, 2015, 12:27 PM), https://www.value
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Activists, MARKETWATCH (May 1, 2017, 3:07 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/pass
ive-funds-arent-afraid-to-throw-their-weight-around-as-activists-2017-05-01 [https://perma.
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firms. Significant concerns have been raised about the influence of proxy
advisory firms on shareholder voting.143 Evidence demonstrates that such firms
have the ability to sway up to twenty percent of the shareholder vote.144 In this
regard, it may be a misnomer to suggest that shareholder voting is reflective of
their normative preferences. However, the reliance on proxy advisory firms is
only further evidence of the shareholder activism norm. First, the mere fact that
shareholders are seeking out guidance on how they should exercise their vote is
evidence of rejection of the apathy norm, which presumes that shareholders have
no desire to vote, let alone vote responsibly. Second, the mere fact that
shareholders are choosing to vote or otherwise follow the directions of some
entity other than directors is enough to undercut the apathy norm. Hence the
reliance on such firms is further evidence of the acceptance of activism.
B.

The Corporate Shift
1.

By Their Own Conduct

The fact that corporations have voluntarily implemented policies and
procedures whose purpose is to increase shareholders’ voting power and
influence reveals a normative acceptance of shareholder activism. This fact can
be seen in a wave of acceptance. First, majority voting. In 2004, fewer than one
hundred companies,145 and fewer than thirty S&P 500 companies, had majority
voting regimes.146 Today, nearly ninety-three percent of S&P 500 companies
have some form of majority vote regime.147 Second, board declassification. In
2018, ninety-five percent of S&P 100 companies and ninety-two percent of S&P
500 companies had declassified boards as compared to fifty-five percent of S&P
500 companies in 2004.148 Third, proxy access. Only two companies had
143
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120, at 129.
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2007) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=24751
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vote campaign began).
146
See Brooke A. Masters, Shareholders Flex Muslces; Proxy Measures Pushing
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147
Zombie Directors and Board Accountability, ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
(July 16, 2014), http://www.rgrdlaw.com/news-item-Zombie-Directors-Board-Accountabilit
y-071614.html [https://perma.cc/44KB-QNJW]; see also Marc S. Gerber, US Corporate
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adopted proxy access in 2013.149 Only fifteen companies had proxy access prior
to 2015.150 As of July 2017, over eighty-five percent of S&P 100 companies and
over sixty percent of S&P 500 companies had adopted proxy access
provisions.151 As of June 2018, over seventy percent of S&P 500 companies had
adopted proxy access.152
Individually and collectively, the board’s implementation of these
procedures, clearly aimed at enhancing shareholder power and influence,
appears to evidence a belief that such power and influence are appropriate.
Shareholder proposals are non-binding and hence even if they receive a majority
of the shareholder vote, the board is under no obligation to implement them.
More importantly, boards historically have ignored shareholder votes in this
area, choosing not to implement shareholder proposals even when they receive
a majority of the vote.153 For example, empirical evidence reveals that corporate
directors strenuously and repeatedly resisted shareholder efforts to declassify the
board.154 Such directors refused to implement declassification even when a
sizeable majority of shareholders approved proposals for declassification, and
even when those proposals passed for several consecutive years in a row.155 In
resisting implementation of such proposals, directors stressed their belief that
declassification was not in the corporation’s best interests, at least in part based
on the view that shareholder influence and activism was inappropriate.156 The
shift in favor of implementation therefore appears to reflect an acceptance that
such influence is appropriate.
The fact that directors voluntarily implement proposals prior to any
shareholder vote underscores the appearance of this belief. Most of the 2017
proxy access proposals never even went to a vote.157 Instead, the proposals were
withdrawn because companies voluntarily adopted proxy access provisions prior
https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/PDF%20Files/Research%20and%20Insight
%20PDFs/SSBI2014web14Nov2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/9C4T-Z99M]; David A. Bell,
Corporate Governance Survey - 2018 Proxy Season Results, FENWICK & WEST LLP (Jan. 7,
2019), https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/corporate-governance-survey-2018-pro
xy-season-results.aspx [https://perma.cc/X94Z-EWZX].
149
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(July 1, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/01/proxy-access-highlights-of-the2017-proxy-season/ [https://perma.cc/SJG3-LXBL].
150
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to any vote.158 Moreover, there has been a general increase in the number of
withdrawn proposals as management works with shareholders to voluntarily
adopt their proposals. Thus, in 2018, fifteen percent of shareholder proposals
were withdrawn.159 Boards presumably understand that they have no obligation
to implement these procedures. Their decision to do so can be viewed as an
affirmation of their belief that doing so is in the corporation’s best interests and
thus is normatively appropriate.
Then too, the fact that directors affirmatively implement policies even when
they do not receive a shareholder proposal further highlights their shift in
viewpoint. Thus, many companies simply preemptively have adopted, and
continue to adopt, shareholder policies and procedures aimed at empowering
shareholders.160
The fact that directors have affirmatively and actively reached out to their
shareholders is another sign of their embrace of activism. In 2017, eighty-two
percent of companies indicated that their board or management proactively
reached out to the company’s largest shareholders.161 As this suggests, boards
are not just willing to engage when asked, but also are affirmatively seeking out
engagement because they believe it to be important. According to the 2017
Spencer Stuart Board Index, “many boards value the opportunity to meet with
shareholders.”162 The existence and prevalence of shareholder-board
engagement stands in sharp contrast to the virtual absence of such engagement
in the apathy era. This increased desire to engage with shareholders can be
understood as a shifting understanding of the need for shareholder influence and
insight, and thus the shift towards the activism norm.
2.

In Their Own Words

Perhaps the most compelling evidence that boards have embraced the
shareholder activism norm stems from their own words. I have reviewed
hundreds of federal proxy statements. In those statements, boards of directors
clearly have stated that they “believe” allowing shareholders to have greater
voice and influence over corporate governance affairs is in the best interests of
the corporation. Those statements also reflect directors’ views that consideration
of shareholder perspective is an important aspect of good corporate governance.
In other words, federal proxy statements of the many hundreds of companies
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that have adopted shareholder empowerment mechanisms are replete with
language reflecting an embrace of the shareholder activism norm.
The board of Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc. not only proposed its own proxy
access bylaw, but later recommended approval of a proxy access bylaw proposed
by shareholders.163 The Abercrombie shareholders’ supporting statement
declared that proxy access “will make directors more accountable.”164 In
response, the Abercrombie board stated that it had carefully considered the
proposal and was recommending adoption because the board believed such a
bylaw was “in the best interests of the Company and our stockholders.”165 The
board’s response appeared to reflect their agreement with the notion that making
the corporation more accountable to its shareholders was in the corporation’s
best interest.
In recommending that the shareholders support a proposal to declassify the
board, the board of Banc of California, Inc. stated that it based its belief on the
board’s outreach to investors, its understanding of corporate best practices, and
its belief in the importance of shareholder accountability. The Banc board stated
that it had carefully considered the issue, and after such consideration, the Banc
board stated that it had determined that declassification was in the corporation’s
best interests.166 The Banc board stated, “[A] classified structure may appear to
reduce directors’ accountability to stockholders, since such a structure does not
enable stockholders to express a view on director’s performance by means of an
annual vote.”167 The Banc board also stated that it had engaged in outreach with
its large shareholders who supported declassification.168 The Banc board then
expressed its belief in the importance of adopting corporate governance best
practices, before pointing out that majority voting had come to be viewed as a
best practice.169 These statements not only reveal that the Banc board believes it
is important to consider shareholder views, but also that the Banc board believes
it is important for shareholders to be able to use their vote to enhance
accountability. This also appears to reveal a belief in the normative
appropriateness of being able to ensure shareholder accountability.
According to the board of Barnes & Noble, Inc. (“B&N”), it recommended
adoption of a declassified board structure because such a structure would
enhance accountability to stockholders, ensure that stockholders have the
capacity to influence corporate governance policies, and hold management
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accountable for implementing those policies.170 The B&N board pointed out that
the company historically had believed that the classified board held advantages
for the corporation.171 However, the B&N board stated that it had taken note of
current corporate governance trends leading away from classified boards based
on the importance of ensuring accountability to shareholders.172 The B&N board
then stated that its institutional shareholders believed that director elections
reflected “the primary means for shareholders to influence corporate governance
policies.”173 The B&N board noted that it had carefully considered board
declassification and held ongoing discussions with its institutional
shareholders.174 Based on these considerations, the board concluded that
declassification was in the corporation’s best interests.175 These statements
reveal the B&N board’s belief that it should consider shareholder views as well
as its belief that the board should ensure that shareholders are able to use their
vote to hold directors accountable on matters related to corporate governance.
These statements also make clear that the B&N board believes that it was in the
corporation’s best interest to provide structures that allow for shareholder voice
and influence.
Other boards similarly have stated a belief in the appropriateness of
shareholder influence along with the appropriateness of adopting corporate
structures that allow for such influence. The board of Cutera, Inc. stated that,
after careful consideration, it believed that declassification was in the best
interests of the corporation and its stockholders because it would provide the
stockholders with the “opportunity to register their views on the performance of
the entire board each year and thereby enhance the board’s accountability to
stockholders.”176 In recommending that shareholders approve majority voting,
the board of Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. stated that the majority voting standard was
in the corporation’s best interests because it would give shareholders a “greater
voice” in determining board composition while reinforcing shareholder
accountability to directors.177 The board of Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc. stated
that it had decided to recommend approval of majority voting because it would
“further enhance shareholder participation in the company’s corporate
governance and director elections.”178
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The weight given to shareholders’ views is apparent even in disagreements
between boards and shareholders. Some boards acknowledged, for example, that
they may disagree with shareholder concerns, but then stated that they would
recommend adoption of shareholder-empowering mechanisms despite this
disagreement based on their belief in the importance of considering
shareholders’ views when establishing corporate governance practices and
policies.179 Thus, the board of United Rentals, Inc. stated the following:
The Board continues to believe that the retention of the Company’s existing
supermajority voting requirements for certain fundamental changes to the
Company’s corporate governance provides stockholders with very
meaningful protections against actions that may not be in their best
interests. On the other hand, the Board recognizes that certain stockholders
and institutions disagree and believes that acknowledgement of this
perspective is an important matter of corporate governance.
Accordingly . . . the Board has determined to recommend a vote to approve
the Simple Majority Amendment.180
The fact that directors believe that they should advance shareholders’ voices
in corporate governance matters even when they disagree with the mechanism
related to such advancement strongly suggests boards’ embrace of a norm
favoring shareholder influence over apathy.
Collectively, the statements made by directors in federal proxy materials
reveal that boards have come to believe that shareholder influence is normatively
appropriate. These and similar statements from corporate boards reveal
directors’ beliefs that enhanced shareholder voice is in the best interests of the
corporation and the shareholders.181 They also indicate a belief that
consideration of shareholder views represents a critical aspect of good corporate
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governance.182 Finally, they indicate a belief that the corporate governance norm
has shifted away from apathy and towards shareholder activism.183
C.

A Norm but Not Normative?
1.

Pressure vs. Preference

Some may resist the assertion that directors have embraced the shareholder
activism norm, based on the notion that directors have acceded to shareholders
because of shareholder pressure rather than any affirmative preference for
activism over apathy. Indeed, some have criticized shareholder activism based
on their concern that shareholders have pressured directors to take actions
despite directors’ belief that such actions are not in the corporation’s best
interests.184 Such critics contend that directors have bowed to the demands of
shareholders with special interests even when those interests do not align with
the interests of the broader shareholder class.185 Others imply that directors have
focused on shareholders with short-term interests or otherwise have focused on
short-term goals despite their desire to focus on the corporation’s long-term
health and sustainability.186 Such criticisms imply that directors have acquiesced
to shareholder demands not because they agree with them, but rather because
they feel pressured, coerced, or even blackmailed.187 This critique negates any
inference that director adoption of shareholder empowering mechanisms reflect
their embrace in the propriety of such power or those mechanisms.
182
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explaining their investment strategies to shareholders); Lipton, supra note 105.
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However, in contrast to these suggestions, when directors adopt shareholder
empowering mechanisms, they profess a belief in their propriety. As noted in
Section III.B.2 above, federal proxy statements are filled with language
reflecting an embrace of the shareholder activism norm. These statements
indicate that directors believe that shareholders should exercise their voting
authority to hold directors accountable and influence corporate governance
matters. These statements also indicate directors’ beliefs that governance
structures should be designed to facilitate such exercise. These statements
therefore undermine the notion that directors’ actions do not reflect a belief in
the propriety of shareholder empowerment. Instead, these statements reflect
directors’ stated embrace of shareholder activism as an appropriate component
of corporate governance.
2.

Preemption vs. Preference

Some may disagree with the concept that directors’ acquiescence to
shareholder activism reflects their embrace of such activism, based on the notion
that directors’ acquiescence serves as a preemptive strike. Based on this
disagreement, it could be argued that directors have made the decision to
voluntarily implement shareholder empowering devices in order to prevent more
intrusive devices that may be recommended by shareholders. Indeed, under the
federal proposal rules, if directors implement their own bylaw related to a
particular corporate governance matter—such as majority voting or proxy
access—they can prevent shareholders from including a proposal addressing a
bylaw related to the same matter.188 Some corporations have successfully
excluded shareholder proposals on this basis.189 Moreover, these exclusions
often occur under circumstances in which shareholders view the corporate
proposal as less empowering than their own proposal.190 Some may therefore
argue that to the extent directors have chosen to implement shareholderempowering procedures in this manner, their choice may not be characterized as
an embrace of the shareholder activism norm.
However, this argument misses the point for at least two reasons. First, even
if directors choose to adopt empowering devices as a preemptive strike, they
nevertheless use rhetoric indicating that their adoption does aim to provide
shareholders with enhanced voting power and authority. From this perspective,
while directors’ actions may reflect a disagreement with the shareholders
regarding the appropriate mechanism by which to confer power, they
nevertheless confirm the crucial norm, embracing a belief that the augmentation
of such power is appropriate and in the corporation’s best interests. In other
words, directors’ words and actions acknowledge the propriety of shareholder
power, even if they indicate disagreement about the contours of that power.
Second, it is possible that directors’ actions can best be understood as a reflection
188
189
190

See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 85, at 14.
See id.
See id.

2019]

FROM APATHY TO ACTIVISM

1335

of a cost-benefit analysis, pursuant to which directors have made the decision
that it is more beneficial to grant shareholders power under mechanisms
prescribed by directors rather than by shareholders. Many of the directors’
statements in federal proxy statements claimed that directors have engaged in a
careful consideration of the benefits and drawbacks associated with augmented
shareholder power.191 However, this cost-benefit analysis does not negate an
embrace of shareholder activism. At a minimum, the cost-benefit analysis
underscores directors’ belief that there are costs related to ignoring shareholder
demands for greater influence. This analysis also reveals that directors believe
it is normatively appropriate to consider shareholder influence and activism
when making important governance decisions. The analysis further reveals
directors’ belief that it is appropriate to put a thumb on the scale in favor of
activism over apathy. In this regard, even the preemptive strike reflects an
embrace of the activism norm.
3. And Then There Were Hedge Funds
To be sure, it is undeniable that many directors have not accepted the
normative premise that hedge funds should be engaged in activism.192 Instead,
most directors have indicated that they do not believe that shareholder
empowerment, as wielded by many hedge funds, is in the corporation’s best
interests or is otherwise normatively appropriate.193
However, this indication does not undermine the shift away from apathy.
Instead, it underscores the fact that directors have come to believe that
shareholder power is appropriate for some (but not all) shareholders.
Shareholder activism has highlighted the fact that shareholders have different
characteristics and agendas.194 It is clear that directors have embraced the
propriety of activism, but only with respect to certain shareholders. Thus,
through their words and actions, most directors have indicated that they believe
activism is appropriate for those shareholders with a long-term interest in the
company or otherwise for those shareholders who do not engage in “shorttermism.”195 Indeed, even vocal hedge fund activism opponent Martin Lipton
has begun working to facilitate engagement between public companies and
institutional shareholders focused on the long term.196 This is a pivotal
concession. Historically, directors appeared to accept the notion that shareholder

191
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See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 46, at 1283-84.
195
See Steven A. Rosenblum, Hedge Fund Activism, Short-Termism, and a New Paradigm
of Corporate Governance, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 538, 542-43 (2017).
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apathy was appropriate for all categories of shareholders. Today, directors
appear to believe influence by certain shareholders is appropriate and preferable
to apathy.
4.

The Reality of the Rhetoric

Some may contend that this Article’s reliance on directors’ words is
misplaced because such words are mere window-dressing and cannot be used as
any indication of directors’ actual normative beliefs. This contention is
problematic for at least three reasons. First, directors’ words and behaviors
historically represented the primary evidence used to support the proposition
that directors had a normative preference for apathy. Why should directors’
words and behaviors have less sway as evidence to support the current
preference for activism?
Second, directors have a fiduciary obligation to take actions that they
reasonably believe are in the best interests of the corporation.197 If their words
are meaningless and therefore invalid, then should we believe that directors have
adopted mechanisms that they do not believe are in the corporation’s best
interest? If so, does this not suggest that directors have breached their fiduciary
duty? Unless we concede that directors have breached their fiduciary duty, we
must acknowledge that directors actually believe that their actions in embracing
shareholder activism benefit the corporation and that such actions therefore are
normatively appropriate. In federal proxy disclosures, directors clearly indicate
that they have “carefully” considered the shareholder proposal as well as the
arguments on both sides.198 Only after that consideration do directors
affirmatively state their belief in the propriety of shareholder influence by
recommending the adoption of particular procedures and policies. Directors’
statements related to their careful consideration suggest that directors are aware
of their fiduciary duty and that their statements and conclusions reflect
compliance with that duty. Any other characterization almost requires the
conclusion that directors have breached their fiduciary duty. This Article insists
that such a conclusion is not warranted.
Third, if we believe that directors’ words are mere window-dressing, then we
are also suggesting that directors may be committing securities fraud. The
“rhetoric” being used by directors comes in the form of statements made in the
federal proxy statement and other federal disclosure documents. Federal
securities laws forbid making statements that are untrue or misleading in the

197
See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
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power begins with basic principle that corporate directors have fiduciary duty to act in best
interest of corporation’s stockholders); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-812 (Del. 1984);
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proxy statement or in connection with a proxy solicitation.199 If directors have
made statements that they do not actually believe, is that not tantamount to
saying that directors have voluntarily committed securities fraud? Given the
sophistication of directors and their counsel, this Article contends that it is more
likely that directors actually believe the statements they have made in federal
disclosure documents than that directors have consciously decided to engage in
securities fraud.
Based on these considerations, this Article insists that directors’ rhetoric is a
reflection of their reality.
5.

The Holdouts

There are some directors who have not embraced the shareholder activism
norm. One example of this is Netflix, Inc. Netflix shareholders approved
proposals for declassified boards at five consecutive annual meetings from 2012
to 2016, with shareholder support ranging from seventy-five percent to eightyeight percent.200 Yet Netflix has consistently refused to implement board
declassification.201 Similarly, Netflix shareholder proposals seeking a majority
vote received more than eighty percent of the votes cast in three annual
meetings.202 Yet Netflix has consistently refused to adopt a majority voting
standard.203 Netflix directors appear to have a preference for apathy.
However, Netflix (and companies similar to Netflix that have not embraced
shareholder empowering mechanisms) only highlights the importance and
significance of the actions and words of other directors. As Netflix clearly
reveals, directors are free to ignore shareholder preferences if they believe doing
so is in the corporation’s best interests. The fact that so many directors have
chosen not to follow Netflix’s example underscores their own assessment that
these empowering mechanisms are appropriate. In other words, Netflix
represents the exception that only proves the norm.
Moreover, the fact that some directors may disagree with the appropriateness
of the activism norm does not negate the trend towards acceptance of the norm.
Indeed, even when the apathy norm was dominant, there were instances of
activism as well as some who disagreed with the norm.204 In other words, the
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norm has never been universal. Instead, like with this current era, it represented
the dominant understanding of how shareholders should behave.
IV. THE FUTURE OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
Recently there have been developments seeking to undermine shareholder
activism. In particular, there have been developments in the capital markets
designed to mute the impact of shareholders’ influence, such as the reemergence of dual-class stock and the increase in companies remaining private,
thereby avoiding the public market and its attendant shareholder activism. At the
federal level, several laws have been proposed that are designed to mute the
impact of shareholder influence, including laws altering the shareholder
proposal rules as well as laws seeking to amend say on pay provisions. This Part
analyzes these developments to assess what, if any, impact they are likely to
have on the shareholder activism norm.
A.

Snap and Dual-Class Stock

Some companies have made the decision to issue stock to the public with
reduced voting rights. In its 2017 initial public offering (“IPO”), Snap Inc. issued
stock to the public with no voting rights.205 To be sure, Snap represents an
extreme and hence no other company has made the decision to completely
eliminate voting rights for its public shareholders.206 However, some companies
have made the decision to issue stock with unequal voting rights. This
phenomenon, known as dual- or multi-class shares, occurs when a company
splits its stock into different categories and gives owners of one class greater
voting rights than owners of the other.207 Such a structure allows a small group
of shareholders, typically the founders or key insiders, to retain control of the
business.208 When a public company has dual-class stock, it means that the
voting power of the publicly held stock is less than that of the stock held by
private investors, which generally includes company founders and other
insiders.209 For example, at Facebook, Inc., the Class B shares have ten times the
voting rights of the Class A shares.210 The Class B shares are held by Mark
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Zuckerberg and a few other insiders, while the Class A shares are held by the
public.211
The number of companies with dual-class voting structures has risen over the
last decade. In 2005, only one percent of U.S. companies that went public had
dual-class voting structures, but close to twenty percent of U.S. companies that
went public had such structure in 2017.212 The number of companies with dualclass voting structures increased by forty-four percent between 2005 and
2015.213 By 2009, more than eight percent of public companies had dual-class
shares; this rose to more than twelve percent in 2012.214
On the one hand, if the number of companies with dual-class structures
continues to grow, that growth will have a negative impact on shareholder
activism. Companies may implement these structures for different reasons. For
example, such structures ensure that certain individuals, such as the founder or
a key executive, maintain control in order to implement a particular vision.215
However, it is clear that the impact of such structures is to limit the influence of
shareholders.216 Moreover, some companies have made clear that their purpose
in implementing such structures was to limit the impact of shareholder
activists.217
On the other hand, it is possible that shareholder activism will impede the
continued growth of companies with dual-class share structures. Indeed, dualclass shares are not new. Many companies adopted dual-class stock structures in
the 1980s as a response to hostile takeovers.218 Shareholders raised similar
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concerns about its rise and impact during that era.219 Ultimately, however, the
number of companies embracing such structures did not rise significantly.220
Hence, it is possible that concerns are unwarranted.
Moreover, it is possible that the embrace of the shareholder activism norm,
particularly by shareholders, will serve to counter any increase in dual-class
shares. Indeed, in the 1980s, no one considered that shareholders would seek to
play a significant role in curtailing the potential rise in such structures.221 Today,
however, shareholders and their advocates have been vocal in their opposition
to dual-class structures in the public markets.222 This includes efforts to
encourage legislative prohibition of such structures.223 Notably, some
shareholders have been successful in these efforts.224 This success underscores
the fact that shareholder activism has taken root as well as the fact that such
activism may be very difficult to uproot.
B.

Going Private

Many new companies are avoiding IPOs.225 Some have suggested that this
avoidance is linked to shareholder activism.226
To be sure, the movement away from going public could decrease shareholder
activism by shrinking the amount of activism in line with the overall public
market shrinkage. It is also possible that some may seek to curtail shareholder
activism based on a concern that such curtailment will make the public markets
more attractive.
It is not clear how this issue will play out. A host of federal laws and other
market factors have made it easier to access capital outside of the public
markets.227 Thus, irrespective of efforts to encourage public market
participation, it is possible that the trend towards avoiding IPOs or going private
may continue. However, as the next Section suggests, the normative embrace of
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shareholder activism makes it unclear whether and to what extent legislative or
other efforts will be able to entirely derail the shift away from apathy.
C.

Federal Efforts

There have been several efforts at the federal level to reduce the impact of
shareholders. In June 2017, the House passed the Financial CHOICE Act (the
“Choice Act”), which includes provisions aimed at amending the shareholder
proposal rule.228 Those provisions include increases in eligibility rules for
submitting a proposal and the resubmission thresholds.229 Similarly, the House
Financial Services Committee passed a bill that focuses on altering the
resubmission thresholds for submitted shareholder proposals.230 These efforts
make clear that there is interest at the federal level to rollback shareholder
activism.
However, the embrace of the shareholder activism norm may render these
efforts unworkable. The institutional investor opposition was so strong that
when the Choice Act was finally passed, it did not include amendments related
to the shareholder proposal rule.231 The fact that shareholders were able to
jettison the efforts at curtailing shareholder engagement further emphasizes the
activism and shareholders’ belief that their voice should not be curtailed.
Moreover, many have predicted that even if federal legislation serves to
eliminate some of the mandates that encouraged shareholder influence, there
may be a private ordering response that mutes the effect of such elimination.
Then too, because much of the shareholder influence emerged through private
ordering, it is not clear if federal legislation can completely undercut that
influence. Indeed, as Section II.C reveals, corporations have voluntarily altered
their governance practices and procedures. Such corporations would have to
affirmatively alter those procedures to rollback shareholder influence. It is not
clear whether companies would be willing to engage in such an effort. This is
especially true given companies’ growing belief that those procedures are in the
corporation’s best interests. In other words, because companies not only have
adapted to shareholder influence, but also have come to believe and accept the
propriety of shareholder influence—at least in some respects—it seems unlikely
that those companies will engage in efforts to completely dismantle that
influence.
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Short-Termism Concerns

Some have argued that shareholder activism’s focus on the short term would
trigger its eventual demise. In a 2013 article, Professor Lynn Stout predicted that
shareholder primacy, and its related focus on increased shareholder power, seem
“poised to fall, perhaps even more quickly than it ascended.”232 Professor Stout
insisted that shareholder activists’ focus on short-term stock prices, ignoring the
interests of other constituents and selling vital assets, not only made shareholder
power undesirable, but also increased the likelihood that it would quickly come
to an end.233 In support of this prediction, Professor Stout pointed out that many
influential members of the corporate community who initially embraced
shareholder power had come to view it with disfavor.234 Importantly, corporate
officers and directors have been able to stem the tide of shareholder power by
strenuously insisting that such power was antithetical and dangerous to the
interests of other constituents.235 Hence, it is possible that such a narrative could
undermine the current effort to enhance shareholder power, while encouraging
a return to shareholder apathy.
However, Professor Stout admitted that her prediction about the demise of
shareholder power was made with caution.236 In light of the continued growth of
shareholder power, coupled with its embrace by shareholders and directors alike,
her prediction has not yet come to pass. Importantly, Professor Stout and others
have taken aim at shareholder power particularly when it is used to promote a
concept of shareholder wealth maximization that focuses on short-term financial
gains at the expense of focusing on long-term interests, including those of
customers, employees, and society.237 One reason why shareholder influence
may weather the storm is that shareholders have played a role in altering the
narrative related to corporate purpose. Rather than coinciding with a crowding
out of other constituent interests, the rise in shareholder activism may have
ushered in a different understanding of corporate purpose, at least for some
shareholders. In fact, in a 2005 article, I suggested that shareholder power could
be used to advance the interests of other constituents.238 Professor David Webber
has made a similar suggestion.239 Consistent with this prediction, some
shareholders and their advocates have played a role in ensuring a corporate focus
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beyond short-term profits.240 This includes not only public pension funds, but
also influential asset managers and mutual funds such as BlackRock, State
Street, and Vanguard.241 The fact that shareholders have used their increased
power to augment the interests of other constituents not only may make such
power more appropriate in the eyes of some, but also may mute the concerns
that such power may prove detrimental to other corporate stakeholders.
E.

Retail Investors

As indicated in Part II, most retail investors have not been a part of the
increase in shareholder activism.242 This is concerning for a number of reasons,
including that retail investors may have interests that diverge from those of
institutional investors. Thus, future shareholder activism that continues to
exclude retail investors is problematic. This Article therefore supports efforts
aimed at enhancing activism and participation among retail investors.
F.

A Note for Regulators

On the one hand, this Article primarily focuses on the impact of recent
developments on the shareholder activism norm and thus grapples with the
extent to which those developments may impact the future of shareholder
activism. On the other hand, this Article maintains not only that there has been
a descriptive and normative shift from apathy to activism, but also that recent
developments are not likely to completely undermine that shift. As a result, this
Article also maintains that regulators must better account for the shift. To be
sure, the SEC appears to be mindful of the shift and hence may be better prepared
to take steps that appropriately account for it. However, the SEC is not the only
agency that regulates the conduct of corporations and their investors. Moreover,
there are some trends suggesting that other agencies are not appropriately
accounting for the shift from apathy to activism. For example, prompted by
research and scholarly attention from others, a recent article by Professors
240
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Edward Rock and Daniel Rubinfeld illuminates some ways in which
institutional shareholders’ increased activism may create antitrust concerns.243
Rock and Rubinfeld also suggest that the current regulatory environment may
be ill-equipped to sufficiently respond to these concerns.244 The authors point
out that the current regulatory framework, coupled with regulators’ outdated
presumptions of shareholder apathy, not only may lead to inappropriate
applications of the law, but also may undermine shareholder activism or
otherwise lead to suboptimal behavior on the part of investors seeking to reduce
their liability risks.245 While a more systematic analysis of the manner in which
regulators must account for the shift towards the shareholder activism norm is
certainly warranted, it is beyond the scope of this Article.246 However, any such
analysis likely should focus on at least four considerations. First, regulators
should consider the manner in which increased shareholder activism may raise
concerns that are not captured by the current regulatory framework. In other
words, do shareholders’ increased activism and engagement trigger violations
of the law in ways previously unanticipated?247 Second, regulators should
consider the extent to which the current regulatory framework or current
intepretations of that framework, including intepretations of safe-harbor
provisions, are consistent with the new shareholder activism norm.248 Third,
regulators should consider the extent to which the regulatory framework
undermines shareholder activism or otherwise may constrain activism in an
inappropriate manner.249 Fourth, and consistent with these prior
recommendations, regulators must plan for the future of activism. Indeed, as
Rock and Rubinfeld note, scholars already are suggesting changes to federal
laws that may be driven by an understanding of shareholder behavior that is
incompatable with the existing shareholder activism norm.250
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CONCLUSION
This Article highlights a new reality for public company shareholders. Public
company shareholders have been active. Indeed, few would dispute the notion
that public company shareholders have become increasingly more active around
a range of governance issues and that such activism runs counter to the traditonal
manner in which shareholders engaged with the corporation.
This Article also highlights a lesser acknowledged normative reality.
Shareholders and directors have come to accept the propriety of shareholder
voice and influence. They have come to believe that shareholders can and should
play a role in holding directors accountable and shaping corporate practices. Of
course, there continues to be significant debate regarding the contours and extent
of that role. There also continues to be significant debate about which
shareholders should play such a role. However, there is no longer a debate about
the appropriateness of the role itself. Shareholders have become active and
directors have accepted that such activism can be beneficial to the corporation—
at least when wielded in an appropriate fashion and when wielded by
shareholders deemed to have appropriate goals.
Of course making future predictions is always difficult. It is entirely possible
that the shareholder activism norm will decline as quickly as it emerged.
However, even if this possibility exists, it is clear that, at least at present,
shareholder activism has toppled the shareholder apathy norm. It is therefore
important to at least acknowledge this present norm. Perhaps more importantly,
in light of the fact that shareholder activism has been embraced by so many
shareholders and by so many of the key stakeholders within the investment
community, it is more probable that the activism norm will remain a fixture of
the future corporate governance landscape at least to some extent and with
respect to some shareholders. Hence, it is also important to more carefully
consider the future implications of a corporate governance norm that favors an
active shareholder.

